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Epistemic Injustice in Research Evaluation: A
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in Estonia
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Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu
is paper explores the issue of epistemic injustice in research evaluation.rough
an analysis of the disciplinary cultures of physics and humanities, we attempt to
identify some aims and values specic to the disciplinary areas. We suggest that
credibility is at stake when the cultural values and goals of a discipline contra-
dict those presupposed by ocial evaluation standards. Disciplines that are better
aligned with the epistemic assumptions of evaluation standards appear to produce
more “scientic” ndings. To restore epistemic justice in research evaluation, we ar-
gue that the specicity of a discipline’s epistemic aims, values, and cultural identities
must be taken into account.
Keywords: epistemic injustice, research cultures, aims and values in research prac-
tice, evaluation
1. Introduction
e scientists interviewed during our study describe a state of aairs that
supports Joseph Rouse’s claim that the laboratory sciences “deploy more ef-
fective forms of power” (Rouse 1987, 202).1 As research evaluation standards
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1 e context of Rouse’s claim is criticism on J. Habermas’, C. Taylor’s and R. Rorty’s account
of the humanities as purely interpretive and thus context-dependent sciences, whereas the
natural sciences are seen by them, in one or another way, as a uniform kind, free of inter-
pretation. Rouse nds this distinction to be inadequate and insists in his criticism upon
the interpretive dimension of the natural sciences which has oen been neglected. He ex-
plains the privileged position of the natural sciences by reference to power relations. e
position is due not even to their strength in the laboratory or to having laboratories in the
rst place but to ecient use of laboratories as the instruments of power. e practices
of the natural sciences include the ambition of manipulation and control of the research
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in Estonia have become increasingly bureaucratic, they rely on the quanti-
tative publication and citation data collected in national electronic research
information systems, such as ETIS,2 and the internationalomson Reuters
Web of Science. Although such evaluation strategies are oen presented sim-
ply as eciency-oriented, and applicable to all academic disciplines, we ar-
gue that most are in fact compatible with laboratory sciences’ standards and
practices.
In this paper, we seek a cultural explanationwhy the laboratory sciences,
such as physics,3 seem to have an advantage over humanities disciplines. In
order to avoid repeating academic “folklore”, or taking an a priori stance to-
ward the scientic disciplines, we attempt to nd out how scientists identify
the position of their disciplines among other sciences and how they con-
ceptualise their individual activities, pursuits, and careers in the academic
hierarchy. At the same time, we try to retain a critical stance toward our
empirical ndings and interpretation. Our analysis is based on data from
interviews with 36 Estonian physicists and 23 humanities researchers. Our
method of analysis uses both culture contrast and the organisational the-
ory of cognitive styles. Stephan Fuchs, a theoretical sociologist, contrasted
the laboratory sciences with the humanities as the opposite ends of the en-
tire spectrum of dierent scientic organisations and practices (Fuchs 1992),
making a distinction that will be challenged by our empirical ndings from
both physics and humanities cultures.eoretically inspired by the work of
AlisonWylie (2011) andMiranda Fricker (1998, 2007), we use the concept of
epistemic injustice to discuss the Estonian research evaluation model, be-
cause its criteria correspond to the interests of laboratory sciences better
than the humanities. As a result, the latter elds suer from unjust eval-
uation, losing their academic credibility. For the sake of epistemic justice
we argue that cultural dierences in disciplinary areas should be taken into
account in their evaluations. A more just evaluation would prevent valuable
contributions from being discounted or lost and would thus contribute to
sustaining high quality of research. As a starting point, we will highlight sev-
eral key characteristics and values specic to disciplinary practices through-
out this paper.
In the following section (section 2) we address the issue of epistemic
objects—and laboratories are the best place for that—whereas the humanities do not have
similar ambition. See (Rouse 1987, Ch. 6).
2 ETIS—Eesti Teadusinfo Süsteem, the Estonian Research Information System, see www.
etis.ee.
3 Physics, like many other academic research areas, involves both the elements of laboratory
science and those of purely theoretical discipline, however, as we take theoretical deliber-
ation to be part of research practice, and as it in the case of physics is directly or indirectly
related to laboratory practices, we study physics as an example of laboratory science.
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injustice in the broader theoretical context of naturalised philosophy of sci-
ence. Relying on Fricker’s idea that in the conditions of competition the
norms of credibility might start to imitate the structure of social power,
we analyse the case of research evaluation criteria for the laboratory sci-
ences and humanities in Estonia. In section 3, we describe our methodology
for empirical investigation, the method of culture contrast—a qualitative
method for cultural analysiswhich uses semi-structured in-depth interviews
for gathering information about the culture being explored. In section 4, a
conceptual framework developed by Stephan Fuchs in organisational the-
ory of scientic workplace cultures is analysed. Fuchs’ characterisation of
the scientic cultures in terms of mutual dependence and task uncertainty
provides us with fruitful preliminary contrasts between laboratory sciences
and humanities, but a closer look reveals that a more detailed cultural anal-
ysis is inevitable for the explanation of the power structure which appears
via the evaluation results. Fuchs helps us to explain why the formalised sci-
entometric evaluation is better suited for laboratory sciences in general, but
since the disciplinary identities are no longer homogeneous in contempo-
rary science, local cultural analysis of the research areas is needed.
e cultural analysis in section 5, illustrated by the interview quotes,
brings the local values, aims and specicities of the disciplinary identities
into light, for instance, showing radically dierent attitudes toward ideolo-
gies and the ways of arriving at the truth. e description of cultural dif-
ferences enables us to suggest in section 6 what we nd to be the reasons
why humanities appear less credible based on the results of formal sciento-
metric evaluation. e hidden epistemic assumptions of scientometric ap-
proach, the presupposed naïve empiricism, even though inadequate as an
account for any discipline, any science, is better suited for the disciplinary
cultures of laboratory sciences than humanities. e aims and values of the
humanities appear to contradict the formalised scientometricmodel for sev-
eral reasons—the humanities outcomes are not tracked by the information
systems and indexes to a comparable degree with the laboratory sciences,
short research article is not an approved genre of publication in the human-
ities, etc. We reach a conclusion that current academic evaluation standards
mis-measure the achievements of the humanities, discrediting their disci-
plines in comparison to those in the laboratory sciences. Even if it is not
intentional, it is epistemic injustice. For epistemic justice to be restored in
research evaluation, the specicity of disciplinary aims, values, and cultural
identities must be taken into account.
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2. eoretical considerations: the problem of epistemic injustice
Until recently, academic analyses of scientic workplace cultures, identities,
and styles of scientic work have been developed only in empirical disci-
plines such as science and technology studies (STS), sociology of science,
and in some areas of gender studies and organisational studies. In the phi-
losophy of science, the socio-cultural conditions of knowledge production
have become a signicant topic due to the rapid progress of social episte-
mology. Social epistemology involves, on the one hand, a normative philo-
sophical approach that seeks to improve our understanding of the process
of knowledge-making. On the other hand, the eld relies on empirical data
about the composition and dynamics of epistemic communities. e fast-
growing literature in the eld shows why the study of research communities,
specically their organisation and culture, is relevant for the philosophy of
science. For instance, Helen E. Longino has analysed what social conditions
increase objectivity, suggesting a package of criteria for ecient transforma-
tive criticism (Longino 1990, 2002). Hermodel of transformative criticism is
meant to facilitate communication between researchers with dierent back-
ground assumptions and social positions, so that all competent community
members can participate in the dialogue. Ideally, this communicativemodel
would enable researchers to detect and remove biases andmistakes and thus
lead tomore objective research results. But to remove communication barri-
ers, one has to be able to recognise them. Gender biases can be one of those:
Kristina Rolin has argued that gender is a relevant issue for the philosophy of
science since it may inuence a researcher’s credibility in a particular com-
munity. In other words, because of the inuence of certain power structures
(e.g., gender) on communication practices, members of underrepresented
groups may experience epistemic injustice, and objectivity criteria may be
neglected (Rolin 2004).e epistemic integrity of a research group, or larger
research community, depends to a great extent on the eciency and char-
acter of their communication. In this paper we will understand the natural
sciences, like any other eld of research, as cultural groups characterised by
certain power structures that have direct inuence on their communication
practices.e issue of epistemic injustice is the focal point of AlisonWylie’s
recent paper, in which she analyses the standpoint theory of feminist episte-
mology with respect to the issue of social segregation in the sciences.4 She
denes epistemic injustice as amisrecognition of subdominant knowers and
subdominant forms of knowledge (Wylie 2011, 162). Referring to Miranda
4 In her paper, Wylie shows that the empirical data collected by feminist activists about the
large number of minor cultural obstacles for women and/or racial minorities in the every-
dayworkplace practices in science institutions, serves as a proof for the claimof hermeneu-
tic and testimonial injustice.
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Fricker’s work (1998, 2007), Wylie describes this process in terms of testi-
monial injustice, calling it “a form of systematic epistemic misrecognition”,
arisingwhen “norms of credibility ‘imitate structures of social power’, so that
‘working indicators’ of rational authority pick out the powerful and not nec-
essarily the knowledgeable or the truthful” (Wylie 2011, 160). Wylie refers to
another type of misrecognition, termed ‘hermeneutical injustice’ by Fricker.
is formofmisrecognition indicates “systematic gaps in the interpretive re-
sources available to epistemic agents that put thosewho aremarginal socially
and materially at an epistemic disadvantage, not just testimonially but also
conceptually and communicatively” (Wylie 2011, 161). Wylie points out that
testimonial injustice goes along with a loss in credibility and thus misrecog-
nition of epistemic agents, which in turn results in institutional inequity con-
cerning hiring, tenuring, promoting, and awarding grants.
According to Fricker, the norm of credibility is a fundamental norm of
any epistemic practice (Fricker 1998, 172). In the conditions that she de-
scribes as “minimal practice in the state of nature”, this norm is operating re-
liably, its indicators pointing to rational authority. However, under the social
pressure, for instance, in the conditions of competition, the norm of credi-
bility might start to imitate the structures of social power, and its working-
indicator-properties will then tend to pick out the powerful as more credi-
ble than powerless. In these circumstances, while one group experiences a
credibility decit, the other experiences overspill. Biased credibility norms,
as numerous empirical studies on genderedworkplace cultures have shown,5
and asWylie indicates, translate into patterns of hermeneutic injustice, rather
than open and deliberate discrimination. An unfriendly working environ-
ment, unfair local distribution of smaller tasks between researchers, and
hostile everyday communication patterns can culminate in hermeneutic in-
justice, testimonial injustice, and a loss of credibility. Furthermore, it is pos-
sible that a chilly workplace climate and gender segregation will impact the
overall development of a eld of study; topics and methods will likely be
selected according to dominant viewpoints, and decisions are likely to be
made by dominant groups.
In our case study on Estonia’s cultures of physics and the humanities, we
apply the theoretical notion of epistemic injustice not to race, age, or gender,
but to the cultures of research disciplines. Application policies for funding
and their respective evaluation procedures have been discussed in public,
and are therefore deemed to be fair and transparent. All disciplinary areas
have been declared to be in equal standing in grant competitions, with qual-
ity and eciency being themajor determining factors for all. Nevertheless, a
5 See, e.g., (Rossiter 1995), (Hasse and Trentemøller 2008), (Hasse and Trentemøller
2011),(Wennerås and Wold 2001).
Endla Lõhkivi, Katrin Velbaum, Jaana Eigi 113
closer look at local research cultures in the conditions of competition reveals
both hermeneutic and testimonial injustice, as our empirical study shows.
e competition for resources has its inuence on the operating credibility
norms. e positioning of disciplinary cultures in the academic landscape
seems to display the traits of epistemic injustice with respect to the evalua-
tion criteria in the humanities in comparison to the natural sciences. More
specically, the humanities experience diculties with grant and project ap-
plications due to the evaluation standards in Estonia.6 According to the
current regulations, the evaluation is based to a large extent on such qual-
ity criteria as the researchers’ h-index, number of citations, previous success
in obtaining additional funding, participation in the international projects,
doctoral schools, etc.7 Hermeneutic injustice, in this case, results from a lack
of understanding of the dierences in disciplinary cultures and their every-
day practices. For instance, the impact factor, h-index, is not applicable to
the humanities in the same way as in the natural sciences simply because
most of the research outcomes, either academic journal articles or mono-
graphs, in this area are not indexed by theWeb of Science. Evaluation based
on h-index makes the humanities in general seem far less trustworthy than
they deserve. Secondly, the fact that citation practices dier signicantly in
the humanities, social sciences and natural sciences, has not been taken into
consideration. Internationally, the variation of citation practices discipline-
wise has been analysed, e.g. by Audrey Baneyx (2008), Nancy Adler and
Anne-Wil Harzing (2009). ese authors claim that in comparison to the
omson ReutersWeb of Science,Google Scholar and other new information
systems take more humanities and social sciences publications into account
and provide a more balanced view.
One of the central theoretical principles for naturalised philosophy of
science is the need for the scientic success to be assessed in terms of the
degree to which the scientists have achieved their aims and goals.8 e
evaluation criteria should not contradict researchers’ values and aims. Cur-
rently the specic aims of research in the humanities, the researchers’ self-
perceived identities (i.e. their role both in academia and in wider society),
the local approach, and the method-specic features of the workplace are
ignored by the Estonia’s academic grant and project application evaluation
standards. As the empirical interviewmaterial shows, researchers in the hu-
6 Since nearly all research funding in Estonia is project based, the extent and quality of the
research activities depends entirely on the success of the project applications. For further
information see the website of the Estonian Research Agency: www.etag.ee.
7 For more information, see “Guidelines for evaluation institutional re-
search funding applications”, www.etag.ee/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/
IUT-taotluste-hindamisjuhendi-kinnitamine-LISA.pdf.
8 E.g., (Giere 1988, 7).
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manities are not against evaluation, but the evaluation should concernmore
the very content and quality of research, rather than formal indicators, such
as the number of citations, publishers’ ranking, etc.e analysis of the epis-
temic background assumptions of the established evaluation criteria shows
that the general form of inquiry of the laboratory sciences serves as the epis-
temic model for universal evaluation criteria.9 Because they are assessed
based on the criteria of the laboratory sciences, the humanities lose credi-
bility, have less epistemic authority, and are therefore less able to dene what
counts as good research.
3. Sources of Empirical Data and the Culture Contrast Method
In this paper, we seek a local cultural explanation for the epistemic inequity,
asking what factors make the existing evaluation criteria unjust for the hu-
manities. Our analysis relies on the empirical data collected in the course of
an international research project aiming at a cultural explanation for a recent
phenomenon that many researchers have le academic careers in physics.
On several occasions during the investigation of physics cultures, questions
about humanities cultures arose. In order to address them, we extended the
method of culture contrast, which was already in use for the empirical study
of physics culture, to a study of the humanities. Alongside our empirical in-
vestigation, we discuss, in philosophical terms, what practices scientists see
as epistemically preferable for conducting high-quality research, and why.
In the interdisciplinary project called UPGEM (Understanding Puzzles
in the Gendered EuropeanMap Brain Drain in Physics through the Cultural
Looking Glass) spanning the years from 2005 to 2008, we studied physics
workplace cultures with partners from ve European countries. We paid
special attention to scientists’ career choices and identity formation, seek-
ing gendered patterns of inclusion and exclusion of people, ideas, and work
styles (Velbaum et al. 2008, Hasse and Trentemøller 2008, see also www.
upgem.dk). Our subsequent project was initiated in Estonia in 2010, and
aims to explore the cultural similarities and dierences between the physi-
cal sciences and humanities. During the pilot period, we did not select one
particular disciplinary culture for investigation, but instead addressed the
humanities as a whole. Since 2011, our focus has become narrower, and we
specied history as our main eld of research in the humanities. In the cur-
rent paper, however, we use all the material collected so far and address hu-
manities in general.
59 semi-structured in-depth interviews were made (36 with physicists
and 23 with humanities researchers). Roughly half of the respondents were
9 See section 6 in this paper.
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male and the other half were female. ere were also interviews with those
who used to work either as physicists or humanities researchers, but had
le the eld by the time of interview. e scope of respondents according
to academic career level was chosen purposely wide—ranging from PhD
students to full time professors.
Data was qualitatively analysed using the culture contrast method that
enables making visible the context in which we act, the cultural factors that
guide us, in order to understand “what makes people think-feel-talk-act in
ways that everyone in their group takes to be normal” (Traweek 1992, 440).
e empiricalmaterial was treatedwith care and respect but quotationswere
not perceived as mechanical building blocks of current analysis. It is taken
into account that their nal meaning is established in comparison with the
other interviews used here.
Overall, the method can be expressed by three questions:
1. What eects do researcher’s categorisations have on informant’s cat-
egorisations?
2. What eects do informant’s categorisations have on researcher’s cat-
egorisations?
3. What eects do the researcher’s categorisations have on other re-
searchers’ categorisations? (Hasse and Trentemøller 2009, 53)
e method of culture contrast focuses mainly on the second type of ques-
tions: when science, an academic culture, becomes the object of research,
many categories are used in a similar way by the researcher and the intervie-
wee. But the use of certain key words and ideas can vary between dierent
scientic disciplines, making it necessary that the interviewer be open to the
dynamic development of research categories during the interview. e ex-
pansion of the semantic eld of the categories ensues from allowing for one‘s
prejudices to be challenged.
Using the method of culture contrast, we attempt to identify and anal-
yse what disciplinary values emerge as culturally-specic. We proceed with
the assumption that the cultures (and practices) of the natural sciences and
humanities dier. ough the disciplines share some similarities, i.e. both
are regulated by the unied Estonian science-policy system, the local mean-
ings of many conceptual categories and research methods remain dierent.
e humanities were studied aer physics cultures, resulting in an analy-
sis heavily inuenced by the latter’s cultural categories. In other words, the
meanings of physics culture became presuppositions. When similar ques-
tions were applied to humanities cultures, contrasts emerged.
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e quotes in the paper have been selected from among several similar
ones to give evidence of the existence of certain views, positions and atti-
tudes. ey have been compared with each other and those which express
the point most clearly or strongly have been cited by us.
4. e Workplace Cultures of Physics and Humanities
In this section we are going to characterise the types of work organisation
in the humanities and physics research. In order to achieve the epistemic
aims of a group, research work has to be arranged in an ecient way in the
workplace. e types of organisation as well as the local cultures vary from
one discipline to another.e analysis of organisation patterns and the local
cultures and practices enables us to reach better understanding of the roots
and development of the epistemic injustice in evaluation.
When we began our comparative analysis of physics and the human-
ities, we assumed that the two disciplinary areas were distinctive cultures
and would thus provide us with suitable material for the method of culture
contrast. We chose Stephan Fuchs’ distinction of cognitive styles in science
as a general framework (Fuchs 1992), with the intention that it would bring
to light and explain certain anticipated dierences. Fuchs uses a sociologi-
cal lens to examine the work styles, form of knowledge produced, and the
similarities and dierences between various sciences and humanities dis-
ciplines. His theory uses two key concepts of organisational theory: mu-
tual dependence and task uncertainty. Mutual dependence describes the ex-
tent to which scientists’ work depends on the work of other scientists and
other institutions that distribute resources and professional accreditation.
High mutual dependence results in uniform and universally-accepted re-
search practices; as control over resources is concentrated and centralised,
alternative and idiosyncratic approaches are not supported. Lowmutual de-
pendence allows for the coexistence of multiple approaches and paradigms;
accordingly, less uniformity and agreement exists about methods and re-
sults. Task uncertainty describes the extent to which scientic production
is routinised and predictable. Uncertainty is low when problem denitions,
problem-solving methods and criteria for judging solutions are stable and
universally agreed upon. Uncertainty is high when problems are not clearly
dened, and methods and criteria are multiple and controversial.
According to Fuchs, the characteristics of high mutual dependence and
low task uncertainty are typical for hard natural sciences. ese are ex-
pensive areas of research and require a great deal of highly concentrated
resources. Statements that are supported by such resources, and are regu-
larly cited by other scientists, are unlikely to be questioned. Accordingly, the
natural sciences are oriented toward producing solid “facts”, requiring close
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cooperation between both individuals and groups. Scientists are therefore
usually condent about the validity and rationality of their research meth-
ods and the knowledge they produce. Our interview material conrms this
characterisation:
Interviewer: e next question goes well with what you just said,
in your opinion, is pursuing physics individual or group work in its
essence?
P320:10 It should be more about group work, yes, for there to be any
results. Otherwise, there’s just so much work that if you do it all by
yourself, you won’t get anywhere.
Interviewer: Do you consider the work of a physicist an individual
thing or is it a group eort?
P333: It’s both. It’s strictly a group eort in the sense that a self-
employed person can be a tailor, a hairdresser, a beautician, but a
physicist can never be a self-employed person. So you won’t be able
to sell formulae on the market [laughter] and what a physicist does
acquires a meaning in relation with, in connection with the science
of physics that is done by a large number of people. So this kind of
a [. . . ] nancially nor content-wise can an independent physicist do
anything independently.
In the contemporary context, scientists have expressed frustration, arguing
for a change in science policy that would stop the dispersal of resources and
concentrate them in the hands of those groups that deal with the most im-
portant and/or prestigious problems in the eld, and eciently produce in-
novative research. For instance, one Estonian physicist expressed his disap-
pointment:
P 302: Money is divided equally to all considering the personalities,
not according to what they do or what they’re capable of. Science is
an elite area, some can handle it and some can’t. e ones that can,
should get the money.
Another physicist resonates with the worry about the loss of time and other
resources caused by the project-based organisation of work:
P306: e nancing of science used to be like a clock-work, that the
scientists were freed frommanaging the laboratory. Now they have to
if they want to do something more serious, think in economic terms
10 Capital letter ‘P’ refers to interviewed physicists and, respectively, ‘H’ refers to humanities
researchers. e interviews have been transcribed one-to-one without any linguistic cor-
rection or abbreviation. e individual way of expression has been preserved also in the
English translation.
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and plan the activities. . . . [S]cientist has to be now an entrepreneur
and I don’t like it.11
In contrast, low mutual dependence and high task uncertainty are typi-
cal for the social sciences and humanities; resources are less expensive and
more widely dispersed, allowing for multiple schools and traditions. Social
sciences and humanities statements are less likely to turn into universally-
accepted “facts”; instead, these elds produce “conversations” andhermeneu-
tics. ere is more space for disagreement, alternative interpretations, and
less pressure to cooperate. A critical and self-reexive attitude toward both
methods and results is common and desirable.
Fuchs suggests that certain elds become highly bureaucratised when
research follows standard methodological rules, because ndings can be as-
sessed using formalistic criteria and colleagues can routinely measure the
value of each other’s contributions. High bureaucratisation is only possible
with low task uncertainty, which produces relatively uniform research and
evaluation practices. In turn, these features are typical of organisations with
highmutual dependence and cohesion, those of the natural sciences. On the
other hand, high uncertainty and a lack of clear problem denitions contra-
dict bureaucratisation; these qualities produce a variety of methods, a plu-
rality of local standards, and possibly disagreement over ndings and their
merit. Pluralism and disagreement are typical for elds with low mutual
dependence, e.g., the humanities. is dierence between the two cultures
was recognised by our informants. One physicist described the dierence in
terms of method:
P333: Well, rst and foremost physics diers fromhumanities because
it has a certain method. So whereas the humanities, let’s say, psychol-
ogy, sociology, could be compared to a bush where there are dierent
schools, right, dierent schools follow from dierent assumptions,
and a very strong thing is quotation and authority.12
Fuchs’ distinction explains why bureaucratised control and evaluation is as-
sociated with, and suited to, the natural sciences. Compared to the humani-
ties, the natural sciences have lower task uncertainty and higher mutual de-
pendence, which are the prerequisites of formal, rigid, and bureaucratised
11 ese two quotes need to be seen in the historical perspective of the Soviet-time large and
relatively ecient research institutes where the academic personnel was free from admin-
istrative and economic concerns.e rst interviewee has adopted the new high research
standards and favours a competitive pattern of distribution of resources, whereas the other
insists on the nostalgic image of time of research in conditions of unlimited resources (Vel-
baum et al. 2008).
12 By the quotation and authority the informant means here not the quantitative indicators
but the traditions that in humanities are oen related to renowned scholars and fashionable
trends or ideologies.
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evaluation procedures. So, if we use Fuchs’ distinction as our point of depar-
ture, it is plausible to suggest that as Estonia’s current evaluation procedures
are increasingly formalised, more of a negative response would be provoked
from the humanities than from the natural sciences. Yet our research has
shown that reactions to evaluation procedures, and the topic of evaluating
research quality more generally, are more nuanced and complex both in the
humanities and the natural sciences.e rst point that counters Fuchs’ pic-
ture of the two opposites is our observation that both the natural sciences
and the humanities suer fromuniformbureaucratic evaluation procedures.
Many bureaucratic requirements and standards run contrary to the policy-
makers’ intentions, resulting in diminished eciency and quality. Further,
bureaucratic restrictions can stie innovative ideas and critical dialogue in
the scientic community:
P318: Now there are a hundred thousand ocials who you constantly
have to hand in reports, lie all the time. ey make people lie all the
time. [. . . ] [T]hemediocre ones sit and can’t do that much science but
they feel comfortable being science managers—they dabble a bit in a
laboratory and then go to a meeting where they start ordering others
around. . .
In addition, exaggerated bureaucracy may result in the exclusion of signif-
icant critical perspectives. What seems even more worrisome is that re-
searchers have started to plan their activities to produce results that best
match xed bureaucratic categories, creating projects that are designed to
produce as many high-rank publications as possible.is indicates that the
hierarchy of the publication categories of the research information system
is currently providing direction to the activities of some researchers.is is
so both in physics and the humanities, but as we shall see in the following
sections, the pattern contradicts the disciplinary orientation and aims of the
humanities more than physics. An informant in the humanities has char-
acterised the diculties of planning the unit’s activities in the conditions
of the internal conict between real research interests and the power of the
academic information system as follows:
H02: It is not set, nobody gives orders, butwe have theResearch Infor-
mation System, which is not an information system but the need as a
head specialist to be a leading scientist [. . . ] I mean that one’s research
should be chosen in the interests of what is—what is the specialty’s
material future, not only in terms of content. I mean, one should aim
at research that is nanced, and my specialty is [. . . ] I mean it does
not belong in the category of small specialties, but it still is a small
specialty. It is national literature, it should be highly respected, but
my task is to make it international. So that those priorities I need to
determine myself in my research, have to decide myself, are actually
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to a large extent compromises between what I am really interested in
and what is required in institutional terms so that my specialty would
get nanced.
Second, according to Fuchs’ preliminary contrast, the natural sciences are
seen as producing solid “facts” whereas the humanities and social sciences
are interpretive and produce “conversations”. is distinction can be chal-
lenged by two arguments:
1) As withmany other academic disciplines, the natural sciences, includ-
ing physics, should be seen as a narrative-enacting practice13 in which the
emerging “facts” are a part of the activity which produces conversations spe-
cic to physics. To put it more precisely: solid facts are produced by conver-
sations within the eld of physics. Similarly, humanities’ conversations pro-
duce not only interpretations, but some facts (e.g., historical, ethnographic,
anthropological, archaeological) as well.
2) e nature and organisation of research varies from one research
group to another within a discipline, and local workplace cultures dier in
aspects other than mutual dependence and task uncertainty. Dierent peo-
ple, ideas, and practices are included and excluded, the local power struc-
ture and the level of epistemic (in)justice varies from one place to another.
erefore, a more detailed analysis of the local cultural context of the natu-
ral sciences and humanities is necessary. Our cultural analysis is inspired by
Joseph Rouse’s concept of heterogeneous alignments:
Epistemically signicant groups are dened not by the common pos-
session of some presupposed content but by their belonging to par-
tially shared situations, to a cultural eld. “Science” and scientic
knowledge are not framed by the identication of scientic commu-
nities but are among themeanings at issue in the formation and inter-
action of various cultural alignments and groups. (Rouse 1996, 112)
Based on this idea of cultural elds and partially shared situations, we ex-
plore how cultural alignments emerge and are sustained both in the human-
ities and the natural sciences. We take the natural sciences and humanities
not as xed disciplinary areas with static internal features, but rather as cul-
turally created elds of practices.
Because the method of culture contrast presupposes the possibility that
assumptions will be changed during the course of study, we were prepared
13 Rouse explains the narrative enactment as follows: “Scientists make sense of what they
are doing by understanding it as a response to the situation presented by past research
and anticipation of future developments. at is, they continually enact a narrative in the
midst of which their present activities (and those of others) would be intelligibly situated”
(Rouse 1996, 27).
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to modify our initial categories if necessary. Accordingly, we modied and
expanded both our initial categories and our interpretation of Fuchs’ ideas,
combining them with additional frameworks. In the following section, the
interviewed scientists’ identities will be analysed. As Sharon Traweek’s study
of the high energy physics communities in the US, Japan and Europe has
shown, professional identities are created andmodied during the entire pe-
riod of training and subsequently, throughout one’s research career (Traweek
1992). Identities may vary from one career level to another, dierent indi-
vidual skills and talents are evaluated by novices and advanced researchers,
and dierent temperaments may be required for recognition in a particu-
lar research group. Organisational characteristics of a workplace culture,
like those identied by Fuchs, in combination with the following analysis of
disciplinary identities, will provide us with a “map” of the aims and values
present both in physics and humanities cultures. e description of these
identities and values will then be compared with the presuppositions of sci-
ence policy instruments, such as evaluation criteria. is comparison will
allow us to suggest some sources of epistemic injustice.
5. Disciplinary Identities, Aims and Values
Following Traweek’s anthropological approach, we see disciplinary identi-
ties not as predetermined by shared theoretical consensus or a given list of
values, but instead as something developed and modied by an epistemic
group, based on a shared history and future perspectives. “Allies” and “en-
emies” are formed in response to encountered situations, people, and prob-
lems to be solved. is approach has been endorsed by Rouse, who con-
trasted the post-positivist (consensus) philosophy of science with the cul-
tural studies’ perspective, giving credit to the latter for addressing “the ways
in which meaningful dierences and boundaries are established, sustained
and transformed; the ways they fragment; and the tensions and resonances
which indicate that apparently stable identities and dierences are sustained
only by ongoing work” (Rouse 1996, 111).
In our analysis of the collected interview material, we focused on the
following questions:
1. how do these scientists see their disciplinary and personal position
in academia and in society more generally?
2. how do scientists dene the aim of their research work?
3. what is the basis for evaluating others’ work?
4. what kind of obstacles do scientists identify in their work?
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We critically reected on the interview material by contrasting the views of
our informants with each other and our own presuppositions. Our starting
pointwas the new categories that emerged from the interviewswith humani-
ties researchers as comparedwith the physicists’ interviews.ese categories
concerned humanities researchers’ identity, goals and values. Although not
universal, their presence was strong enough tomerit analysis. We found that
like physicists, humanities researchers had two focuses for articulating the
meaning behind their activities: the general goals of their research, and their
chosen methods.
e physicists stated that their goal is to explain and understand fun-
damental processes of the world through simplication and idealisation,
whereas humanities researchers cited their concern with the concept and
meaning of being human. In other words, humanities scholarship is related
to questions that address the identity of a person, group, or nation. In the
interviews, the humanities researchers presented the idea that being human
is strongly correlated to the knowledge and awareness of one’s cultural iden-
tity and context; an understanding of one’s national history and culture con-
tributes to one’s humanity and level of maturity. In fact, ignorance about
one’s culture was said to create an impression of infantilism.e humanities
notion of what dened an adult identity stood in opposition to the identity
of the “playful boy” that emerged in our interviews with the physicists. e
latter group described the value of a childlike joy of discovery and the ability
to hold onto one’s naïve curiosity.
is contrast manifested itself in two ways. First, it was connected to
the notion of creativity, which was deemed vital to both physicists as well as
humanities researchers. Physicists dened creativity as the ability to solve
problems. e “territory” of creativity was broader for humanities re-
searchers, who saw creative self-expression, through the production of art
or literature, for instance, as one of an individual’s main competencies.14
Creative output that is valued in humanities is not limited by scientic pub-
lications. In response to the question of why they might quote a colleague’s
work, one humanities researcher said:
H01: [A]nd [. . . ] while I absolutely don’t care about their some kind of
index or some status. If I see that that any writer thinks interestingly,
asks the right questions, it is not necessarily important that they have
been published by an academic publishing house or in an academic
journal.
In physics, creativity is mainly seen as a problem-solving activity, but also as
playfulness:
14 For an international comparison, see Hemlin and Gustafsson (1996); in their quantitative
study they also showed that in the humanities the individual talent is a dominant value.
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P306: What I have admiredmost is that people are competent in their
discipline, they orientate freely in it, are able to think freely, smell of
sweat disappears from this whole thinking process. It’s like a game
where you can think one way or another.
So, in discussing creativity physicists do not talk about extending the areas
of its application but rather about particular forms of realising creativity in
the primary area of their work.
Second, this contrasting view of the characteristics of an “adult” was rel-
evant to the researchers’ attitudes toward themselves and their age. While
physicists maintained the more common opinion that the most productive
creative period for “real” discoveries is youth, the humanities researchers
believed that the quality of one’s endeavours improved with age. ey de-
scribed expertise as a characteristic that requires time to mature. However,
they argued that it was vital to acquire the skills and attitudes in youth that
cannot be attained later in life. ese skills and attitudes relate to research
methods and can be described under the umbrella term of “criticism”. Hu-
manities researchers believed in the signicance of self-criticism, or the will-
ingness to review and re-review one’s existing points of view, sources, and
theories.
H09: Being an historian means to be able to adequately evaluate the
sources you areworkingwith, ask questions about the research object,
and then set goals, one has to be very consistent, to achieve the goals
and answer the questions posed at the outset.
Only aer acquiring the critical method, the complex of competences and
skills for working critically with the primary sources, the existing literature,
methods and perspectives, one can qualify as a historian. It is this set of skills
that distinguishes a professional historian from an amateur that approaches
research material uncritically and without reection upon one’s methods.
According to the interviewees, one’s ability to acquire these skills de-
pends on one’s training, bringing us to another important contrast between
the two disciplinary areaswith regard to teaching.e physicists rarelymen-
tioned teaching as a part of research work; in several cases teaching seemed
to have a negative connotation for them, and was described in terms of the
opposition “the scientist versus the teaching scholar”. In this relationship,
whereas the scientist is a producer of new knowledge, the scholar/teacher is
a transmitter of ready-made knowledge. In the humanities, the interviewees
presented a more positive attitude related to teaching, as an opportunity to
test one’s ideas:
H01: In general, I like lecturing, [. . . ] and oen I get good feedback
from the company in the classroom, it enables me to order my ideas
and think through my areas of investigation.
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In addition, the idea of responsibility toward younger generations was ex-
pressed more prominently by the researchers interviewed from the human-
ities.
Another contrast emergedwith respect to the pursuit of “truth”, forwhich
the methods and goals of physicists and humanities researchers diered.
In the interviews with the physicists, we identied a perception of the re-
searcher as the “priest of truth”: a personwho serves only the truth, and aims
at uncovering an objective picture of nature. us, physics was depicted as
an area free of ideology:
P309: I am in science strongly convinced that what is called the faith
in truth or serving the truth, or in other words, in order to achieve
results in science one has to [. . . ] well, the objective truth, as such
[. . . ] as such an ultimate goal is placed in themost important position.
And other values would largely have to be subjected to that. . .
Serving the truth is supposed to take precedence over other values like per-
sonal career advancement but also over other goals science may be made
serve. A physicist emphasised that the natural sciences have historically
been free of ideological pressure, even when operating within a totalitar-
ian society.eir ideological neutrality is contrasted starkly with the state of
humanities.
P301: I was interested in very many things, but the main reason why
I and many others started with science subjects was that it was a rel-
atively honest job. It was an area where there wasn’t any ideological
pressure, none whatsoever. Completely honest areas.
Interviewer: What kind of ideological pressure? Youmean compared
with humanitarian areas?
P301: Yes, compared to humanitarian areas where it was totally crazy.
e researchers in the humanities were aware that those in the sciences saw
humanities research entirely as ideology.
H09: So, I had the conversation with the [physicists] [. . . ] It was in-
teresting, the topic of conversation was whether the art history is a
science. Eventually they accepted that it can be a science, whereas
history as such cannot, in no way. For them it is only such an ideol-
ogy.
Humanities researchers recognise this perception of humanities as ideology-
laden. Unlike physicists, they do not attempt to present good research as
ideology-neutral. ey readily admit that humanities research always in-
cludes a broader ideological dimension. Pursuit of truth in humanities relies
on its interpretation and critical analysis rather than an attempt to dismiss
it from the picture:
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H04: [. . . ] [N]ational science has been in some occasions thoroughly
ideology-laden in Estonia. And it is being thought that it always is.
[. . . ] [A]ctually since 1990s our [discipline] has been very critical.
Truth is revealed only through critical analysis.
During the interviews, we also addressed the criteria informants used
to assess the quality of their own work as well as that of their peers’. eir
answers revealed specic disciplinary values. As it was mentioned earlier,
physicists value highly the ability to solve problems, and it was regarded as
the main qualication and research competency:
P319: We must have competence. And precisely—and physicists are
important in this sense, that they are accustomed to solve unexpected
situations, non-standard tasks.
For humanities researchers, value was placed on the ability to maintain a
productive and positive relationship with issues relevant to the local culture.
A vigorously self-reective perspective was also necessary:
H03: [T]he humanities are still those that reect national culture. [. . . ]
[L]et’s say even in literature it is so that literary scholars don’t have
to write books themselves but they denitely have to say something
about those books that exist in the literature that they study, so reec-
tion is still important also there.
A formal criterion for humanities researchers is producing written works
that are thorough and in monograph format. For humanities researchers
to produce worthwhile analyses and criticisms of ideological frameworks,
they must undertake an extensive historical and historiographical study of
the problem, as well as a self-critical reection on one’s methodology and
choice of topic. Attention to the quality of one’s writing is also considered
important—it is valued when humanities research is presented in the best
possible language. However, current science policy discourages writing
monographs, particularly in case of emerging researchers:
H02: I can’t encourage any doctoral students to publish amonographic
dissertation. [. . . ] Everyone is defending using the article-model be-
cause otherwise, if they don’t get a PhD then research institution can’t
register them so that they get paid.is is the project-based manage-
ment.
A younger-generation historian described the conict between the expec-
tations of wider society, and those of academic culture. e latter pushes
historians to publish shorter expert articles in academic journals that are
inaccessible to the public:
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H12: A historian does not write monographs today anymore, and
as s/he does not write monographs, it is practically impossible that
somebody just interested in history could read something, it is im-
possible for a layperson to read scientic journals.
Journal articles may be adequate for sustaining communication between
professional historians but they are not meant for lay readers. Accordingly,
historians can no longer address lay audience and thus play an immediate
role in wider societal cultural debate.
In this interview, and in many others, a conict emerged between the
values and aims researchers see for themselves in connection with the
broader social and cultural context and those imposed on them by science
policy regulations. Humanities researchers seem to be suering more from
this value conict than physicists, as we explain in the following section.
6. Epistemic Injustice in Disciplinary Landscape
In science policy decisions, especially those concerning allocation of re-
sources, the promotion of one research eld over another, or the distribu-
tion of general tasks, an evaluation of previous results and an analysis of the
available capacities and resources is required. In this sectionwe shall see how
the hidden epistemic assumptions operate in the evaluation practices. Any
evaluation model involves specic epistemic assumptions: the description
of the ideal situation of knowledge production, the ideal structure of scien-
tic progress. To a great extent, evaluations of grant and project applications
are based on scientometric data and analysis. Daryl Chubin and Sal Restivo
characterise the epistemic assumptions and the underlying metaphysics of
the scientometric account of science as rather simplistic:
For the scientometrician the world exists sui generis; it can be sam-
pled, measured, captured, and revealed according to ‘objective in-
quirers’.ose inquirers ‘make estimates’ and ‘test hypotheses’ rather
than ‘make knowledge claims’ and ‘construct realities’. (Chubin and
Restivo 1983, 57)
ey want to say that the hidden epistemic assumptions behind scientomet-
rics are those of naïve empiricism, or as it has been described in philosophy
of science, of the “received view”.15 According to this view, scientists are
hunting, collecting and representing new for them “facts” rather than inter-
vening into states of aairs by creating models, telling stories, and in turn,
interpreting the meanings of those constructed models and the collected
data. is is clearly too simplistic an account of science. e problematic
15 See, for instance, (Suppe 1989).
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nature of the naïve empiricism has been thoroughly analysed in philoso-
phy of science, and the view has been abandoned decades ago. It would be
natural to presuppose that the evaluation procedures are built on the most
adequate theoretical account of science; however, in the context of sciento-
metrics, naïve empiricism is still operating. In order to be of value, according
to scientometric approach, every assumed discovery and test result must be
reported in the form of a scientic publication in a peer-reviewed academic
journal. If the results are recognised by the scientic community, citations
will soon begin to appear in other journal articles. Both articles and cita-
tions can be easily tracked by various research information databases and
indexes, making the evaluation on the basis of scientometrics a partially au-
tomated procedure. Journals can be evaluated and ranked, enabling publica-
tions to be automatically assessed based on their venue. Monographs, how-
ever, are more dicult to assess, since they lack the formal indicators which
enable a computer to dene their category. In Estonia, several attempts have
been made to create a list of higher ranking academic publishing houses, to
separate them from the “ordinary” or “regular” ones.16 Based on publisher
rankings, monographs and their sections have been divided into categories
similar to journal articles.
Given the dominating formal scientometric evaluation model, we at-
tempt to outline what sort of disciplinary research styles are better suited
for getting “high grades”, therefore producing higher benets. On the ba-
sis of the descriptions of research cultures, we propose that it is easier for
research areas which in Fuchs’ terms “produce facts” to full the sciento-
metric requirements. A mutually supportive group, with an eective distri-
bution of labour and low task uncertainty, boasting reliable methodologi-
cal grounds without any paradigmatic doubts, has good prospects. A cer-
tain level of playfulness and readiness to take risks would further improve a
research group’s prospect for success, as these qualities are valued by fel-
low researchers, and possibly by the evaluators as well—in case of peer-
evaluation. is description coincides, to a remarkable extent, with Fuchs’
characterisation of cutting-edge laboratory sciences, such as physics in our
case study.17 However, not all sub-disciplines of physics would necessarily
t in with our proposed model of “guaranteed success”.eoretical physics,
a highly prestigious eld (like other primarily theoretically groundbreak-
ing sub-disciplines), produces less indisputable “facts”, putting researchers
in this eld at a disadvantage with regard to formal scientometric evaluation.
16 See (Ross 2012).
17 It is not surprising that scientometric criteria suit laboratory sciences better, as the un-
derlying epistemic view of empiricism was created on the basis of the simplied image of
laboratory science. See, e.g., (Richardson 1998) about early logical empiricism.
128 Epistemic Injustice in Research Evaluation
Disciplinary areas are not homogenous in this sense.eoretical physics re-
tains its high prestige due to its valuable theoretical contribution to the eld
in spite of the lower position in the automatically generated publication rat-
ings.
As we discussed in section 2, theomson ReutersWeb of Science sim-
ply does not measure the work usually undertaken in the humanities. In
the humanities, an internally-valued research outcome is a monograph. To
produce such a publication, the individual researcher must have a produc-
tive connection with the local culture, and therefore needs time to acquire
the knowledge necessary to conceptualise the research object in its wider
context. is is where epistemic injustice comes into play: the work done
in the humanities tends to be mis-measured, and is therefore discredited as
less scientic than other research areas. While the scientometric evaluation
criteria suit relatively well to the practices, aims and values of the laboratory
sciences, reinforcing their epistemic authority and credibility, the impres-
sion created of humanities is poor. At the same time, the research model
of the laboratory sciences cannot be adopted in the humanities—since the
aims, values, and practices are dierent, the publication formats accepted in
the laboratory sciences cannot be adopted in the humanities. e current
evaluation criteria for humanities disciplines in Estonia reect a sharp value
conict that researchers experience as discrimination:
H07: I think behind the rules it’s clearly the lack of resources, and ar-
gumentation that an article in awell-known journal is an achievement
and this gives some people an advantage, and it’s worth emphasising
it, it’s worthmaking it a rule, and this is what has happened [. . . ] when
there are less resources available, and one’s research has to go on, it is
easiest to suggest that the journal Science is the top of the world, and if
you get published there, this is the top of the world, and the rest of the
community are not in the top. But it is clear that an historian cannot
publish in Science, it’s of minimal plausibility, not worth mentioning.
[. . . ] [O]ne discipline sets a universalised standard, and thus one gets
funding for this, and it works well in the Estonian circumstances.
e interviewed humanities researchers envisage qualitative peer-review as
a suitable evaluation model:
H02: [In another country] the quality of one’s research publications
is measured case specically and qualitatively. [. . . ] And when they
are read, the whole picture is looked at, it has a certain complete qual-
itative measure. And what is looked at rst and foremost is whether
they have ever written a book. Whether they have written something
longer, if they have written a symphony not only a sonata, metaphor-
ically speaking.
Endla Lõhkivi, Katrin Velbaum, Jaana Eigi 129
Such a case-specic analysis would demand both signicant time and re-
sources. But as long as the humanities are included in such academic re-
search institutions, their evaluation should take the form of a peer-review
process, based on expert opinion instead of automatically generated and cat-
egorised formal data. To be sure, transparent criteria and shared standards
would be required if this model were to be enacted.
For the fair evaluation of academic research in any area, either labora-
tory science or other, the epistemic assumptions should be placed on ad-
equate basis which should not contradict the internal epistemic aims and
values of the disciplines. Scientic research as a narrative enactment is epi-
stemically successful as long as the activities conform to their aims. us,
evaluation criteria and practices should also conform to a research eld’s
epistemic aims, rather than the needs of bureaucratic information systems.
erefore, the humanities researchers’ recommendation to apply more ex-
pert assessment for evaluation is compatible with the naturalised philosophy
of science perspective: peers in the eld share the same kind of aims and val-
ues and are prepared to provide adequate evaluations.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we compared two academic workplace cultures: the laboratory
sciences (physics) and the humanities, with the intention of identifying some
cultural characteristics which explain the epistemic injustice in current re-
search evaluation. We borrowed the concept from the work of AlisonWylie
(2011) and Miranda Fricker (1998, 2007), who discuss what perspectives are
underrepresented and undervalued in science, and why. In our work, we
took certain disciplinary cultures to be similarly undervalued, due to formal
evaluation criteria and practices. As demonstrated by our empirical inves-
tigation, researchers in the humanities experience a serious value conict
as they are, for the sake of fundraising, forced to full formal scientometric
evaluation criteria by producing easily trackable short-format articles which
are endorsed neither by the humanities community nor by wider society. At
the same time, the researchers feel that, out of respect for the cultures of their
studies, and to contribute to national culture, they should produce thorough
monographs. Unfortunately, this format is not well supported by Estonia’s
ocial research evaluation standards.us, we argue that current academic
evaluation standards mis-measure the achievements of the humanities, dis-
crediting their disciplines in comparison to those in the laboratory sciences.
In general, contemporary evaluation standards strongly favour the organisa-
tional form and outputs of the natural sciences, in which group work dom-
inates and the level of task uncertainty is low. However, alongside time and
resource consuming investigation in the humanities, novel and theoretically
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groundbreaking research in the natural sciences also suers from a credibil-
ity decit in light of these evaluation criteria. For epistemic justice to be
restored in research evaluation, the specicity of disciplinary aims, values,
and cultural identities must be taken into account.
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